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Abstract
Given that I share, mostly, Eugene Matusov’s passionate concerns, picking on his vocabulary might
appear pedantic. However, the issues involved in labeling political movements and, even more, political practices, can be fundamental and address the very grounds on which social analysis must stand.
Briefly, I am concerned with the label neoliberal, particularly when it is used as an epithet and blinds
us to actual processes. I end with some, perhaps optimistic, remarks about the rise of educational
activities that are not already marked for measurement on any pass/fail scale.

G

iven that I share, mostly, Eugene Matusov’s
passionate concerns, picking on his vocabulary
might appear pedantic. However, the issues
involved in labeling political movements and, even more, political
practices, can be fundamental and address the very grounds on
which social analysis must stand. Briefly, I am concerned with the
label neoliberal, particularly when it is used as an epithet and
blinds us to actual processes. I understand that Matusov’s piece
(2011) is polemical, but it is worth taking seriously. By eschewing
this label, I suggest what else we might notice about the current
situation—particularly the historical continuities and the rising
challenges to schooling.
Matusov distinguishes between the neoliberal (bad) and the
democratic (good). He quotes a list of politicians that is impressive
in its breadth across the full political spectrum in the United States.
In this list, George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Bill Clinton, John Kerry,
Edward Kennedy, and Barack Obama are bedfellows in talking
about education in America and what “we” should do about it. I,
too, am struck by a fundamental consensus, at all levels of the
American polity on goals, definitions, imagined practices (policies), methods of assessment and accountability, as well as actual
practices. When the time comes to imagine an iconic problem (why
can’t Johnny read?), a solution (education), an institution (schools),
the people responsible for carrying out the solution (teachers), and
means to assess whether the problem is being dealt with (policies),
then the debates focus on the details of the mechanisms, not on the
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initial imaginative act, and the interlocking web (network) of
institutions and peoples that has kept being reconstituted over the
past two centuries.
This consensus, however, is not a new one, and we must face
the historical continuities. Paradoxically, perhaps, Ronald Reagan
was the last president to resist what we might call (with a bow to
Eisenhower warning Americans about the “military-industrial
complex”) the “educational complex.” Reagan tried, and failed, to
abolish the newly established federal Department of Education,
which continues to give ever more leverage to schooling. The 1983
report A Nation at Risk made this department unassailable on the
same grounds that continue to drive federal policy. The report
starts with a very familiar preamble:
All children, regardless of race or class or economic status, are entitled
to a fair chance and to the tools for developing their individual powers
of mind and spirit to the utmost. This promise means that all children
by virtue of their own efforts, competently guided, can hope to attain
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the mature and informed judgment needed to secure gainful
employment, and to manage their own lives, thereby serving not only
their own interests but also the progress of society itself. (National
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983)

We could go back in time and read similar reports or speeches
from Lyndon Johnson or Theodore Roosevelt. Myself, I would go
back all the way to Horace Mann. In 1846 he wrote a long justification for the state responsibility to tax all citizens so that all children
have access to free public schools. He summarized several familiar
political, economic, and moral justifications for what he called the
Free School:
1. The general intelligence which [Free Schools] are capable of
diffusing, and which can be imparted by no other human
instrumentality, is indispensable to the continuance of a republican
government.
2. An educated people is always a more industrious and productive
people. Intelligence is a primary ingredient in the wealth of nations.
3. Vice and crime are not only prodigals and spendthrifts of their own,
but defrauders and plunderers of the means of others. (1846/1957, pp.
61–62)

Mann goes on to develop a more complex argument based on natural law and the rights of children, but the pattern of argumentation
is already set around the three poles of (in modern parlance)
political participation, human capital, and human development.
Critics from the world of schooling, including Mann, have
always been most uncomfortable with the human capital justification for the Free School. In most of the 20th century, these critics
would have blamed (international) capitalism rather than neoliberal globalization. But the overall debate among apologists,
reformers, and critics has remained set. Through whatever
transformations have occurred to Euro-America (from rural to
industrial, from industrial to mass, onto postindustrial knowledgebased socioeconomic systems), the Free School has come ever
more to dominate and to spread, in the aftermath of European
colonization, around the world. Horace Mann’s dream has been
realized: the Free (state-funded and compulsory) School is now
indeed ubiquitous. It is found everywhere, across the religions,
economies, and political systems that continue to distinguish
various parts of humanity. There is nothing particularly neoliberal
(or capitalistic, or democratic, or socialistic) about the Free School.
But there can be something American, French, or British,
about it. As the dream was realized, differences that do make quite
a lot of difference have arisen. The Free School is also the product
of the kind of cultural production that makes any institution
historically specific. To stress the reality of such cultural production, R. McDermott and I write about the School America builds
(1998), where Matusov writes about the neoliberal school. Our goal
is to emphasize an evolving historical particularism that characterizes the debate as a whole and to de-emphasize this or that version
of the classical arguments. In the apparent debate between the
neoliberal and the democrat, I choose, in a phrase McDermott
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borrowed from James Joyce, “one aneither” side (McDermott, R. &
McDermott, M. 2010).
Whether to use the adjective neoliberal, capitalistic, democratic, or American for the Free School would not matter much if
each label did not make us focus on only some of the overall
mechanisms rather than on others. My sense is that even the most
radical critics must face the tight connection between Democracy,
the Free School, and the Innocent Child, particularly as it relates to
the fight against birth privileges. Several times in the late 18th
century, people gave away the formal privileges they had received
through birth in various powerful speech acts, such as the one
performed by the French nobility on August 4, 1789. But such
constitutional acts have proven never to be quite enough. Again
and again, critics, and even apologists, have pointed out that birth
privilege remains powerful. Bourdieu and Passeron (1970/1977),
with many others, have argued that the reproduction of class
privilege may actually be the primary—though hidden—function
of schooling. I prefer Matusov’s suggestion that the Free School
keeps being “hijacked,” or co-opted, to use a word with slightly
different connotations.
How could that be the case when so much effort has been
spent trying to prevent any such co-optation? To answer this
question, I am convinced that we must investigate mechanisms
rather than motivations. In any event, the motivations for the
attempt to co-opt schooling for one’s own purposes are not
mysterious: What parents would not fight for their children, even if
the means or outcomes may hurt other parents’ children? What
corporation would not lean on school people to get them to
produce what (future employees) it needs? One problem with
motivation analysis is that even “good” motivations can lead to
systemic reproduction. This is why I, personally, would grant that
Kennedy or Obama, and even Bush or Cheney, have the same
overall goal and motivation that Matusov and I have. But people
having the right motivations does not mean that they are right
about means and processes. They are almost certainly wrong in
relying on testing. America will not test itself out of all the achievement gaps that testing reveals. This is all the more certain since, as
Matusov suggests by highlighting one property of all testing, it is
testing itself that produces the gaps. In a recent book, Koyama
(2010) explored other facets of No Child Left Behind to show its
practical consequences for mayors, principals, teachers, and
parents. We must push such analyses to trace more carefully the
mechanisms and linkages that currently allow for co-optation.
Then we will able to make stronger cases for alternatives.
For one such alternative, Matusov looks at the American
Disability Act and the practices it has spawned. This is an intriguing track to explore. It echoes an argument R. McDermott and I
made (1995). It calls to mind a principle of usability in computer
interface design: “a basic foundation of usability is that errors are
not the user’ s fault; they are the system’s (or designer’s) fault for
making it too easy to commit the error” (Norman & Nilsen, 2011).
Users of the well-designed Free School would never fail—except
that not failing children contravenes the Free School’s function of
fighting birth privilege by evaluating the merit of individual
students, and by doing so independently of parents and
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communities. Focusing on human development is all to the good,
but schooling is also about discrimination in that a test is useless if
100% of a population passes it. School people, particularly those
most uncomfortable with recent developments, often pretend that
this discrimination function is not part of a kind of Faustian
bargain they made when they accepted the responsibility of
assessing, and publicly reporting (through grades and degrees), the
merit of individual citizens before they enter full adult participation with the rights and privileges attached to the degrees. In
exchange for a massive expansion of their pedagogical authority—in Bourdieu’s sense, resources, numbers, and power—school
people accepted the task of establishing in great detail that half of
the population is below average in the performance of any task
(learning how to read, teaching how to read, etc.) and, furthermore,
that most people fail at the performance of many tasks, so that only
a very small number can fully participate in top positions. School
people then accepted the even more fateful responsibility of
diagnosing why a person might fail, and then devising remediation,
and then endlessly debating why this or that program is not
remediating what is in fact an artifact of schooling itself. As R.
McDermott and I argued (1998), in a world without schools, there
are no school dropouts and no need to explain it. School people are
thus caught in a catch-22 they will not escape until the credentialing function of schooling is separated from the function of
developing individuals. The former is one a democracy does
require. But this institution may not have to be a school.
Actually, we may be closer to this decoupling than we might
imagine. The paroxysm of school-based evaluations, assessments of
value-added teaching, bureaucracies for control, etc., can only, in
the medium term, lead to radical skepticism. The electorate and its
politicians will come further to doubt the wisdom of those who
claim pedagogical authority over them. Many already do, and they
are getting quite vocal. More will eventually notice that most education, even now, does not proceed through schools, particularly
when it addresses the most significant issues in their lives—on
matters, for example, of health, the environment, the arts and
popular culture, new technologies, religion, etc. The media
(including all aspects of the new information technologies) are
probably already the most powerful educators—after the peer
groups (parents, friends, etc.) that mediate access and interpretation. Al Gore, Oprah Winfrey, Sarah Palin (to mention emblematic
and controversial figures), as well as a person’s parents, spouse, children even, will always be more powerful educators about, say,
global warming, than some half-forgotten high school teacher from
whom one took a class ten, twenty, thirty, forty, or fifty or more
years ago. These mechanisms provide an education in which there
indeed is no failure in the school sense and where self-assessed
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ignorance leads to investigation, discovery, teaching. This is what I
have called the “productive ignorance” (2008) that drives everyday
life. These processes have been given even more power by new technologies. Even now, many attempts by school people to fail some
(by telling them, for example, that fat should not be spelled phat or
that they are wrong when they doubt global warming) are radically
ignored—except perhaps by those institutions who use schoolassessed success as a gatekeeping mechanism.
The philosopher Jacques Rancière (1987/1999) has argued that
true “emancipatory” education must proceed from “ignorant
school masters” who do not seek to inculcate into pupils (and then
assess this inculcation) what they know but to prod people to figure
out for themselves what they must learn (and teach each other)
about some skill. This seems absurd—except that this is the way
almost everyone in the late 20th century learned how to manipulate
new technologies and how we keep learning anew as new software
and hardware keep appearing.
If indeed the Free School becomes as peripheral in education
as the “old” media is said to have become, some of our problems
will become moot. But others will surely arise. Still, with Matusov I
search for alternatives.
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